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Abstract
Five years ago, Kazakhstan embarked on a dramatic reform of its pension and social
security system in order to move from an unsustainable public deﬁned beneﬁt (“solidarity”)
system to one of deﬁned mandatory contributions (accumulative system). While assessment of
long-run success is premature, early results have exceeded expectations. This paper considers
the reform’s rationale and initial impact: Why did the Government of Kazakhstan decide to
introduce a new pension system? What advantages did the state perceive? Was the Govern-
ment’s decision appropriate, and what alternatives existed? The paper also analyzes pension
reform issues that have yet to be fully resolved.
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As of January 2003, ﬁve years have passed since Kazakhstan embarked on a dramatic
reform of its pension and social security system. The reform is an e#ort to move from an
unsustainable public deﬁned beneﬁt (“solidarity”) system to a system of deﬁned mandatory
contributions (accumulative system). It is not yet possible to declare whether the reforms will
be successful in the long run, though the results to date have met or exceeded expectations.
 This research has been funded in part by the US Agency for International Development and by the US
National Institute of Aging through a grant to the University of Colorado. We are grateful to the Statistical
Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Pragma Corporation for data and logistical support. All errors and
misinterpretations, however, remain our own, and the comments herein reﬂect policy neither of the Government of
Kazakhstan nor of the United States of America.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 45 (2004), pp.151-187.  Hitotsubashi UniversityThis paper therefore embarks on the more modest goal of addressing the rationale for the
reform and its initial consequences. Speciﬁcally, we endeavor to answer three main questions:
Why did the Government of Kazakhstan decide to introduce a new pension system? What kind
of advantages did Kazakhstan as a state get from the new system? Was the Government’s
decision appropriate, and what if any alternatives existed? The following sections address these
questions, while a concluding section also discusses issues involving the pension reform that
remain to be fully considered by Kazakhstan’s policymakers.
As Section I indicates, there can be no doubt that the existing pension system was
untenable by the late 1990s, and demographic prospects ensured that the future would be
grimmer still. Reform was therefore inevitable, though moving to an accumulative, deﬁned
contribution (DC) system was only one of several options. From the standpoint of the
Kazakhstani Government, the DC reform as undertaken greatly reduced potential liabilities,
thereby reducing macroeconomic imbalances and pressures on a state that at the time su#ered
considerable ﬁscal stress. The answer to the third question is more subjective; we conclude
that, while plausible and e#ective alternatives did exist, that the Government’s decision to
move to a DC system was itself reasonable. However, our bottom-line assessment is that the
external economic environment during the past ﬁve years has been exceptionally favorable for
the accumulative system reforms, thereby making the reform decision appear less risky and
more prescient than in fact it was. On the other hand, the reforms themselves have helped
contribute to the favorable economic environment by creating demand for private ﬁnancial
sector activities that have been a critical institutional innovation.
F><.1 . C DBE6G>HDC D; I=: SI6I: P:CH>DC FJC9 D:7I 6C9
PG>K6I: S:8IDG EBEADNB:CI, 1994-1997
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The ﬁrst steps to reform Kazakhstan’s pension system actually were taken before the
USSR’s collapse. In response to economic problems, in the late eighties the Soviet Government
enacted the following pension legislation:
 Introduction of the law “On state pensions in the USSR” (April 28, 1990)
 Introduction of the law “On pension provision in the USSR” (May 15, 1990)
 Formation of the Pension Fund of the USSR (August 15, 1990)
In connection with these measures, the Kazakhstani republican division of the USSR Pension
Fund also was established in August 1990. By establishing the USSR Pension Fund as an
independent, “ﬁnancial-banking system” separated from the state budget and funded by
contributions from all type of enterprises and organizations, the Soviet Government signaled
its desire to ultimately create a funded pension system. But in reality, the USSR Pension Fund
operated on an unfunded basis, and therefore the Soviet “Solidarity” pension system remained
a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) program. The situation remained unchanged after Kazakhstan
became independent and created its own, national Pension Fund of the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan, since the law that served as its basis was adopted from the Soviet 1990 law on
pension provision.
The fundamental problems with the reformed Soviet (and then Kazakhstani) PAYGO,
deﬁned beneﬁt pension system emerged only in the post-Independence era. Most immediately,
the Kazakhstan Government’s structural reforms in the areas of privatization generated new
economic principles that came into conﬂict with the “solidarity of generations” principle
inherent in existing pension legislation, and which has remained a social principle even
following the end of the Soviet era. In the absence of motivation to be concerned with future
beneﬁts, the growing private sector quickly learn how to evade paying mandatory pension
contribution. Thus, as the share of employed in private and individual sectors increased from
32% in 1994 to 57.8% in 1997, the Pension Fund deﬁcit increased from 12% to 53% (Figure
1). While individuals with non-payroll earnings are in principle obligated to make contribu-
tions, including 5% social tax payments, in reality contributions from individuals in small
business and professional activities have been insigniﬁcant, especially in the early post-
Independence years (for example, in 1994 such contributions comprised only 0.14% of total
Pension Fund revenue). Given rampant non-compliance, then, it is easy to understand the
growth of the accumulated pension debts of nearly 40 billion tenge by January 1, 1997 (Table 1).
Kazakhstan emerged as an independent nation at the end of 1991 under conditions of
complete dependence on ruble zone partners and, especially, Russia. With the collapse of
inter-republican trade, the simultaneous transition to the market economy, the starting point
of which was the liberalization of prices early in 1992, inﬂation took o#; demand and
production collapsed, and formal sector employment fell dramatically. In 1992 alone, con-
sumer price inﬂation exceeded 3000%, and GDP decreased by 11.3%. Worse was yet to come,
though, as in 1993 Russia ended the ruble zone and stopped supplying other former Soviet
republics with rubles, necessitating the creation of local currencies. The fall in social contribu-
tion compliance thus was accompanied by declining production even during the last years of
the USSR, and then by collapsing GDP during the ﬁrst years of Independence. Since
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +/-Kazakhstan’s Pension Fund was sustained by payroll contributions, these two factors together
ensured that real contributions fell dramatically.
Figures 2-3 present the striking trajectories of the main pension-related economic indica-
tors from 1991 (when Kazakhstan became a sovereign state) and 1994 (when Kazakhstan
became independent ﬁnancially). Note that the rate of decrease of real pension payments in
1992 was signiﬁcantly less than real wage declines. This unsustainable trend then reversed
starting in 1995. Real pensions plummeted in comparison with the preceding year; average real
wages actually rose slightly. However, this picture is somewhat misleading: by 1995, Ka-
zakhstan’s real GDP had fallen to 52.6% of its 1990 level, and the number of formal sector
workers (and especially the number making regular social insurance contributions) fell rapidly
and steadily. By 1995, formal sector employment had fallen by more than 30% relative to
1991; by 1997 the decline was by more than 50% (Table 2). Thus, as Becker and Urzhumova
(1998) emphasize, the wage stability documented in Figure 3 pertained only to a rapidly
dwindling share of Kazakhstan’s labor force.
Of equal or greater importance from the perspective of the Pension Fund, wage stability
in the mid 1990s did not translate into healthy receipts from payroll taxes, and hence a healthy
Fund budgetary situation. Among enterprises that submitted reports to statistical authorities,
the proportion that were unproﬁtable rose from a moderate 11% in 1991 to almost 60% by
1997. This rise translated directly into postponed tax payments to the State Budget, and
accumulating wage arrears (so that recorded wages and actual wage receipts diverged
sharply). Collection e#orts also appear to have deteriorated —ap oint stressed by Auty (1998)
T67A: 1. K6O6@=HI6C’H P:CH>DC SNHI:B:M 6>C IC9>86IDGH, 1994-97
(billion tenge)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Wage bill 111.0 271.7 335.3 339.3
Pension fund revenue collection: 18.5 51.0 71.5 78.9
As % of wage bill 16.6% 18.8% 21.3% 23.2%
Mandatory contribution rate to the
pension fund
27.0% 25.5% 25.5% 25.5%
Total amount of granted pensions
and allowances:
21.0 59.3 111.4 113.9
As % of wage bill 18.9% 21.8% 33.2% 33.6%
Total amount of paid pensions and
allowances:
18.5 52.8 79.8 139.0
As % of wage bill 16.6% 19.4% 23.8% 41.0%
Pension fund deﬁcit: 2.5 8.2 39.9 60.2
As % of total amount of granted
pensions and allowances
11.9% 13.9% 35.8% 52.8%
Accumulated Pension Debt 2.5 8.2 39.9 35.0
As % of GDP:
Wage bill 26.2% 26.8% 23.7% 20.3%
Pension fund revenues 4.4% 5.0% 5.1% 5.6%
Total amount of granted pensions
and allowances
4.9% 5.8% 7.9% 6.8%
Accumulated pension debt 0.6% 0.8% 2.8% 2.1%
Amount of debt paid at the expense
of transfers from Republican budget
35.0
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +/.and Baimateyeva (2002). By 1997, enterprises’ overdue debt to the State Budget reached 7.3%
of GDP, and wage arrears reached 16% of the total wage bill. Largely as a result, Kazakhstan
Government revenue as a share of GDP declined from 38.3% in 1990 to 16.7% by 1997.
The desperate employment situation inevitably had a large, adverse impact on the pension
system’s dependency ratio (deﬁned as the ratio of pension and other social beneﬁt recipients to
the number of social insurance contributors). While there were almost 30 pensioners and
beneﬁciaries per 100 workers paying insurance contributions in 1980, this number rose to 73
in 1997 and then to 83 in 1998 (Figure 4). During this period, the proportion of pensioners and
other social beneﬁt recipients in Kazakhstan’s population rose from 11.9% in 1980 to 17.1%
in 1997. The surging system dependency ratio also reﬂected post-Independence liberalization
of pension eligibility. While nominal retirement ages (55 for females and 60 for males) did not
change from Soviet levels, relaxed early retirement rules increased the numbers eligible for
F><.2 . M 68GD:8DCDB>8 6C9 SD8>6A IC9>86IDGH, 1991100%
F>< 3. M68GD:8DCDB>8 6C9 SD8>6A IC9>86IDGH, 1994100%
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +//pensions.
Shortly after Independence, the Kazakhstan Government amended the nation’s Soviet-era
pension laws (adopted in 1991) with Provision N1521-XII of July 3, 1992, according which
the eligibility for early retirement (53 for females and 58 for males) was extended to those
Kazakhstani citizens with at least 25 years of service for men or 20 years for women, and who
were unable to ﬁnd new employment after being discharged from their prior job due to layo#s
or enterprise closure. Given the prevailing hyperinﬂation and deteriorating economic outlook
in Kazakhstan in 1992-1993, this amendment provoked signiﬁcant early retirement, increasing
the number of old age pensions granted on standard and favorable terms by 19% and 30%,
respectively, and decreasing the number of pensions with incomplete service by 27% in
comparison with 1991 (Figure 5).
These rule changes also changed the structure of Kazakhstan’s pensioner population. The
proportion of pensioners receiving supplemental payments (on “privileged” or favorable
terms) increased from 20% in 1991 to 25% in 1996, while the proportion receiving the legal
minimum pension (typically due to uncompleted service) fell from 4.3% to 2.5%. While this
latter decline could at least in part have reﬂected decreasing voluntary turnover in light of
general economic uncertainty, there are no structural labor market or demographic reasons for
the sudden jump in favorable pensions. In particular, 1992 was a year of explosive growth in
Kazakhstan’s pensioner population overall: the number of new pensions due to standard years
of service, old age favorable pensions, and pensions to individuals prior to normal retirement
age on the basis of “special merit” rose by 19%, 80%, and 139%, respectively (Figure 6).
1
1 Becker and Urzhumova (1998, Section 3) also identify the rise in early and favorable retirements as a
destabilizing force that threatened the Solidarity system.
T67A: 2. M68GD:8DCDB>8 IC9>86IDGH,K 6O6@=HI6C 1990-1997
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Consumer prices (annual
average, % change)
190.9 1614.8 1758.4 1977.4 276.2 139.3 117.4
Market exchange rate, tenge
per US dollar (annual average)
5.31 36.35 61.12 67.76 75.56
Market exchange rate, tenge
per US dollar (end of year)
6.31 54.26 63.97 73.80 75.89
State budget revenues as % of
GDP
38.3 31.6 20.8 24.1 21.7 21.6 17.2 16.7
Consolidated budget deﬁcit as
%o fG D P
7.3 1.4 6.5 3.7 2.4 3.8
Formal sector employment,
1991100
100.0 97.2 86.8 78.0 69.6 60.1 48.3
Share of unproﬁtable enterprises
as % of enterprises that
submitted reports to National
Statistical Agency
10.7 14.1 23.8 35.3 45.7 53.2 57.2
Enterprises’ overdue debt to the
State Budget as % of GDP
5.50% 6.85% 7.27%
Enterprises’ wage arrears as %
of wage bill
12.0% 15.0% 16.1%
Note: These ﬁgures exclude revenues of extra-budgetary funds (and do not include privatization receipts,
which are treated as a ﬁnancing item).
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +/0Clearly, the categories of those eligible for favorable beneﬁts and early retirement enjoyed
a secular increase following Independence. Nonetheless, the abrupt jump in the number of
pensions on favorable terms in 1992-1993 is astonishing. Indeed, especially given the economic
decline during this time, it is near incredible that almost every second person who retired in
1992 did so under favorable terms (Table 4). This surge in favorable conditions’ retirements
appears to lie in imperfections in old pension assignments legislation. According to Article 44
of the 1991 Law on Pension Provision,
“…in the absence of an employment record book (Labor Book) or lack of record-keeping in that
F><.5 . N JB7:G D; P:CH>DCH, 7N C6I:<DGN, 1983100
F><.4 . S NHI:B D:E:C9:C8N R6I>D DNC6B>8H
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +/1book, conﬁrming length of employment, it is permissible to present documents and other evidence
of one’s period of work, as well as certiﬁcates, conﬁrming payments of insurance contributions
into the Pension Fund of the USSR (since 1992, of RK). In the event that no documents on
length of employment are available, the Committee on awarding pensions will determine it based
on testimony. This testimony will not determine nature of work if the documents on period of
work are available.”
Not surprisingly, the existence of many di#erent possibilities to establish one’s employ-
ment record made possible a wide range of falsiﬁcations. These came not only from employees,
but also from employers interested in shifting older workers to pensions in order to reduce
salary burdens during the economic crisis. A simple falsiﬁcation was simply to declare the loss
of one’s Labor Book: the worker could then get a new one and, with the connivance of
management, record more advantageous records on the basis of forged documents. In
addition, it seems virtually certain that corruption among social welfare workers contributed
to the jump in the number of new pensioners. Social welfare workers themselves received very
low wages, but had limited supervisory and auditing control over their activities; there was also
a very low level of computerization of record keeping and reporting with regard to pension
payments. Thus, these workers had ample opportunity and great need to solicit bribes in
exchange for altering documents, and almost certainly did so liberally. Privatization of state
enterprises added further to chaos during this period, making falsiﬁcation easier still —a nd
creating still greater incentives to do so. Thus, accelerating early retirement in the early and
middle 1990s eventually resulted in an increase in the ratio of pension recipients to total
population above 45 years of age from below 50% in the late Soviet period to more than 60%
by 1994. This in turn brought the corresponding share of the total number of beneﬁciaries
(pensioners and social allowance recipients) in the over-45 population to a peak level of 71%
by 1995, a rise of ten percentage points in only four years (Figure 7).
It is also apparent from Figure 7 that, unlike for pensioners, the share of adult social
allowance recipients in the age 45 population was relatively stable during period from 1983-
1997, except for 1991, when the share of this category increased by 2.3%. The source and
signiﬁcance of this increase are clearer from Figure 8, which shows the dynamics of various
F>< 6. TDI6A NJB7:G D; AAA TNE:H D; F6KDG67A: P:CH>DCH, 1983-1997
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +/2T67A: 3. SIGJ8IJG: D; N:LAN R:I>G:9 P:CH>DC:GH,K 6O6@=HI6C 1983-1997
Old age pensions on
standard terms
All type of pensions on
favorable terms
Old age pensions with
incomplete service
1983 79.2% 14.5% 6.3%
1984 78.8% 15.5% 5.7%
1985 79.1% 16.1% 4.8%
1986 76.1% 19.8% 4.1%
1987 74.8% 21.3% 3.9%
1988 78.9% 17.8% 3.3%
1989 78.8% 17.7% 3.5%
1990 77.9% 18.8% 3.3%
1991 77.5% 19.6% 2.9%
1992 54.3% 43.1% 2.6%
1993 78.0% 20.5% 1.5%
1994 63.9% 34.1% 2.0%
1995 66.0% 31.4% 2.6%
1996 70.8% 26.5% 2.7%
1997 84.9% 13.9% 1.2%




















Pensioners, of which 74.6% 81.0% 76.4% 82.4% 77.3% 81.9%
Old age pensions granted on
standard terms
58.3% 62.5% 57.5% 62.5% 56.7% 59.5%
Old age pensions with
incomplete service
3.9% 2.5% 2.0% 1.3% 1.9% 1.2%
Pensions granted on favorable
terms of which:
12.4% 16.0% 16.8% 18.7% 18.8% 21.3%
Old age pensions 11.1% 14.5% 15.4% 16.8% 16.7% 18.6%
Pensions for su$cient
years of service
0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 1.5% 1.7%
Pensions for special
merit
0.9% 1.2% 0.8% 1.2% 0.6% 1.0%
Social allowances of which: 25.4% 19.0% 23.6% 17.6% 22.7% 18.1%
All types of disability social
allowances, including military
benefits
12.8% 10.9% 11.8% 9.1% 13.1% 10.0%
Survivorship social allowances 12.3% 7.9% 9.2% 7.5% 8.5% 7.5%
Old age social allowances 0.2% 0.1% 2.6% 1.0% 1.1% 0.5%
Total pensions and social
allowances
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +/3social allowance categories. This ﬁgure also tracks the gradual (but accelerating during 1990-
93) increase in the number of disability social allowances, and indicated that these numbers
began growing before Kazakhstan’s Independence. This rise appears to have been driven by
enactment of the USSR 1990 Law on Pension Provision. Thanks to this law, social pensions (i.
e., allowances) began to be assigned to those citizens who lacked a right to labor service
pensions, i.e., old-age pensioners without su$cient work history, along with disabled individu-
als and survivors. By implication, the previous Soviet pension system did not cover all people
who needed social support —d espite the generally recognized claim that the USSR had for a
long time provided comprehensive pension coverage. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s post-
F><.7 . M 6>C C6I:<DG>:H D; P:CH>DC 6C9 SD8>6A AAADL6C8: B:C:;>8>6G>:H,
6H % D; TDI6A PDEJA6I>DC DK:G 45
F><.8 . N JB7:G D; SD8>6A AAADL6C8: R:8>E>:CIH, 1983100
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +0*Independence pension problems stemmed not only from the drastic expansion of beneﬁciaries
because of massive early retirement in 1992-1993, but also because the Soviet Government had
just made a generous commitment in 1990 to provide all elderly people, disabled and survivors
with either adequate labor or social pensions. While these promises were well intentioned, they
ultimately became a Soviet legacy to be borne by the successor independent republics,
including Kazakhstan.
Overall, the 25% increase of number of pension beneﬁciaries between 1988 and 1993,
coupled with the rising pension system dependency rate, gave rise to an increase in Govern-
ment pension expenditures from 5.45% of GDP in 1989 to 7.87% in 1996 —t hough not
without collapsing to 4.10% in 1993 as per pensioner payments shrank. Moreover, these
expenditures would have been much higher if the government had completely indexed the
beneﬁt payments in accordance with inﬂation. In reality, though, increased expenditure
demand prevented the RK Government from ensuring even minimum beneﬁts. Consequently,
while the proportion of pensioners receiving old age social allowances increased from 0.2% of
all pensioners in 1989 to 1.1% in 1997 (Table 4), their share of allowances only accounted for
only 0.5% of total payments even in the latter year. Replacement rate dynamics with regard
to old age social allowances (Table 5) and their average values’ deviation from average rates
for all categories of pensions (Table 6) testify to the decline of the minimum pension level. The
biggest deviation (-36.8%) is observed in 1994; despite the fact that by 1997 it was reduced to -
22.7%, the replacement rate with respect to social allowances was only 77.4% of that in 1989.
One way of inferring the causes of the rising pension population and pension dependency
ratio is to relate these rates to underlying economic factors. Becker and Urzhumova (1998) use
pooled regressions across regions (oblasts) for 1980, 1985, and 1990-95 to examine these
linkages. They ﬁnd that these ratios tend to rise as wages fall, and to be greater in areas with
higher pension payments (and it is important to recall that regional governments were
responsible for making social payments, so that actual payments undoubtedly varied far more
than o$cial rules would have indicated). Pension dependency also is strongly negatively
related to the regional investment rates —a lthough these economic forces appear to have
worked mainly through the size of the contributing labor force.
Analyzing Tables 5 and 6 further, it appears that the replacement rate of the maximum
pension (provided on favorable terms) relative to average replacement rates by 1997 had
returned to the 1989 ratio. In contrast, social old age pensions for those with inadequate length
of service were consistently further below the mean after Independence than they were in
1989. This deterioration mainly reﬂected the RK Government’s inability to maintain all
categories of pensions and allowances. Moreover, it is worth noting that stable replacement
rates during a period of declining real wages mask falling real pensions: the maximum
replacement rate ﬁxed in 1994 (58.3%) was far from being identical in terms of its real content
to the one in 1989. On the other hand, the low replacement rate during the waning years of
Soviet power cannot but be a surprise: 35.4% in 1980 and 36.6% in 1989 (Figure 9). However,
if one compares this ﬁgure to pension contributions by multiplying the average replacement
rate by the average system dependency ratio (Figure 10), it appears that this replacement rate
is consistent with social budget balance based on insurance contribution rates at that time.
2
2 In fact, during the 1980s, social insurance contribution rates varied across di#erent branches of the economy.
The maximum rate was 14% for workers in sectors such as civil aviation or machine building; the minimum of
4.4% was set for workers in agricultural enterprises.
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +0+1. The rising payroll tax burden
For the economy as a whole, the required average payroll tax rate necessary to maintain
Pension Fund budget balance —t he required rate of pension contributions from the wage bill
(required payroll tax rate) shown in Figure 10 —h as had a dramatic long-run upward trend
from 1980 through 1998. Deﬁned as the product of the average replacement rate and the
system dependency ratio, it is apparent that the secular increase in the dependency ratio has
been the main force in the trend. 1993 is the main anomaly, when the average replacement rate
(28.6%) declined markedly, although, as we know, there was no sudden fall in the number of
pensioners and hence in the system dependency ratio (47.7%).
4
3 The replacement ratio (RR) shown in this table has been calculated by dividing the amount of the assigned
average monthly pensions by number of pensioners as of the end of the year, unlike the RR shown in Figure 8
which has been calculated based on the average annual number of pensioners.
4 There is also a major inconsistency in o$cial data for 1993. Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP)
data do not match the o$cial data, and do not yield ﬁgures consistent with the recorded level of pension
expenditures to GDP, namely 4.1%. In 1993, according to MLSP PIK-94 data, the total amount of monthly
pensions equaled tenge 343.9 million, while average yearly number of pensioners was equal to 2829.4 thousand.
Thus, average monthly pension was equal to tenge 124.7. As the mean wage, according to o$cial data, was 127.5
tenge, then the replacement rate would have been 97.5%. The implied share of pension expenditures in GDP is
then an implausible 14%. Given the data problems for 1993, we worked backward to infer the overall dependency
T67A: 5. R:EA68:B:CI R6I: DNC6B>8H,K 6O6@=HI6C 1989-19973
Categories of pensions and
allowances
1989 1994 1996 1997
1997 as %
of 1989
Total pensions and social
allowances, including
35.9 58,3 48,3 42,2 117,6
Pensions 38,8 62,7 51,0 44,8 115,2
Due to retirement age 38,4 61,8 51,3 44,7 116,3
On favorable terms 46,6 69,3 52,3 47,0 101,0
With incomplete service 23,0 35,4 31,3 26,5 114,9
Social allowances 27.7 43.5 38.9 33.5 120.8
Due to disability of all
categories
29.9 50.4 42.0 36.1 120.8
Survivorship 22.9 48.1 43.2 34.5 163.5
Old age (social) 33.1 21.5 22.7 19.6 59.1
T67A: 6. P:G8:CI6<: PD>CI D>;;:G:C8: (D:K>6I>DC) ;GDB M:6C
V6AJ:H D; V6G>DJH AK:G6<: P:CH>DC P6NB:CIH
1989 1994 1996 1997
Old age pensions 3.0 4.4 2.7 2.5
Due to retirement age 2.5 3.5 3.0 2.5
On favorable terms 10.7 11.0 4.0 4.8
With incomplete service 12.8 22.9 17.0 15.7
Social allowances 8.1 14.8 9.4 8.7
Disability of all categories 6.0 7.9 6.3 6.1
Survivorship 13.0 10.2 5.1 4.8
Old age (social) 2.8 36.8 25.6 22.7
Range:max-min 23.7 47.9 29.6 27.5
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +0,While large deﬁcits emerged, the Kazakhstan Government did take a series of steps aimed
at increasing revenue. Prior to 1992, insurance contributions were accumulated in the Social
Insurance Fund budget, which was part of the State Insurance Fund (Gosstrakh) and had been
used for di#erent types of social security including pension payments. Since 1993, after
establishment of the Pension Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kazakhstan Govern-
ment started dividing total public social insurance contributions between the Pension Fund
ratio from GDP share data. The data problems are due mainly to the fact that all 1993 statistical data were
recorded in the new national currency, the tenge, which was not put into circulation until November 1993. Given
the high inﬂation that occurred for both the rouble and the tenge, it is inevitable that many calculation errors
occurred.
F><.1 0 . T=: AK:G6<: CDHI D; P:CH>DCH (T=: R:FJ>G:9 P6NGDAA
T6M R6I: M D:E:C9:C8N R6I>D)
F><.9 . P :CH>DC P6NB:CIH 6C9 R:EA68:B:CI R6I: DNC6B>8H
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +0-and Social Insurance Fund according to proportions approved annually in the Republican
budget. Moreover, with the establishment of the Pension Fund, its funds were no longer
included in the state budget. The standard rate of insurance contributions in 1992 was 30% of
the wage bill, out of which 80.5% went to the Pension Fund, and 19.5% went to the Social
Insurance Fund. Thus, the payroll tax for pension contributions in 1992 was 24.15%. In 1993,
due escalating economic crisis, the payroll rate was increased up to 27% and maintained at the
level until 1995.
From 1995 through 1997, due to the establishment of the Fund for Mandatory Medical
Insurance (FMMI), the total amount of contributions for public social insurance was divided
among the Pension Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Social Insurance Fund and
FMMI in proportion 85: 5: 10. As a result, the rate of pension contributions decreased by
25.5%, though as Table 1 shows, the Pension Fund deﬁcit as a proportion of total payments
continued to surge.
In summary, it is clear that increased payroll tax burdens on Kazakhstan’s contributing
workers, rising numbers of pensioners, and the deteriorating macroeconomic situation com-
bined to create a powerful impetus for reform of the PAYGO pension system. During the
period 1989-1997, growth of the number of pensioners and recipients of social allowances was
accompanied by a fall in the numbers of social insurance contributors (Figure 11), making
pension security an increasingly critical issue for Kazakhstan’s Government. Something had to
be done: maintenance of Kazakhstan’s Solidarity system with its current levels of funding as
of January 1, 1998 simply was not an option. The question, then, was whether the PAYGO
system could or should be retained in a reformed manner, or whether a completely new
approach should be adopted.
2. Demographics and growth: was the crisis temporary?
One possibility, of course, is that the explosive growth of Kazakhstan’s pension and social
F><.1 1 . TDI6A NJB7:G D; B:C:;>8>6G>:H KH.N JB7:G D;
E;;:8I>K: CDCIG>7JIDGH, 1989100%
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +0.allowance recipients between 1990 and 1997 simply reﬂected economic deterioration, and that
normalcy would return with economic recovery. Obviously, the rising pension population was
linked to economic decline, as was the shrinking contributor base (and their shrinking real
wages). From the RK Government’s perspective in 1997, though, it was far from clear when
sustained recovery would take place. The pension reform decisions were made during a time
of nascent but highly tentative recovery —ar ecovery soon to be halted by the Russian crisis.
More importantly, the horizon was not brighter. The reason for this was simple:
Kazakhstan has a gradually aging population, with declining birth rates more than o#setting
rising adult and elderly mortality rates. The population projections in Table 7, reproduced
from Becker, Seitenova, and Urzhumova (2000, Ch. 3, Table 24), are di$cult for any pension
system to handle. While these ﬁgures are forecasts, it should be realized that those retiring in
2050 already have been born (in fact, 2050 will be the ﬁrst year when most new retirees will
not have been born in the Soviet era —a ssuming retirement ages are not increased in the next
half-century). Thus, the trends depicted for the most part reﬂect demographic events that
already have taken place or are underway. Underlying Table 7 is assumed gradual recovery of
the total fertility rate (TFR) from its current below-replacement level (which appears to be
happening, and which will increase labor force growth after 2020), and also gradually
recovering life expectancy (for which there is very little evidence so far: see Becker, Urzhu-
mova, and Seitenova, 2003). If adult mortality does not decline considerably in the years to
come, then the retirement age population will grow more slowly, but for an unfortunate
reason.
Assuming, then, that economic recovery will bring demographic recovery, Kazakhstan’s
population should have reached a trough in 2001 and then begin to grow, despite total fertility
rates still below replacement level (and the latest data from Kazakhstan’s National Statistical
Agency appear to conﬁrm this). This growth is driven by the large number of young adults,
reﬂecting high birth rates in the 1980s. The combination of a rapidly growing labor force in
coming years due to demographic momentum, and small cohorts of new retirees, causes
Kazakhstan’s pension population to stagnate in the coming decade. Overall, the number of
old-age pensioners in 2010 will be virtually identical to the number in 1999, despite signiﬁcant
mortality recovery. However, starting at the end of this decade, however, the pension
population will begin to grow rapidly, peaking at an annual growth rate of 4.0% in 2020.
These trends imply extremely heavy burdens for a PAYGO system. This is not to say that
such a system could not be fashioned, but it would have to be one based on rising retirement
ages, more stringent social allowance eligibility, or rapid formal sector employment growth.
Whether these conditions could have been met is addressed in the concluding section. But the
impetus for moving away from the Solidarity system toward a deﬁned contribution accumula-
tive system is easy to understand.
So, too, is the timing of the reform. As Table 7 shows, the period from the mid-1990s
through 2004 is a period of declining (old-age) retirement age population, because this is the
retirement era for the very small cohort born during the Second World War. If Kazakhstan
was going to make a switch from its Solidarity system toward an accumulative system, and
intended to lower PAYGO payroll tax rates as part of that reform, then the obvious time to
make the switch would be during a trough in the elderly population. The reason for this is
simple —t he RK Government will experience a period of declining social contributions during
the transition; its burden will be minimized during a small retirement cohort era. In short, the
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +0/stage was set in 1997 for a dramatic reform.
II. The Kazakhstan Government’s Pension Reform Strategy
After nation-wide discussion, the law “On Pension Provision in the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan” was adopted in June 1997. The reform adopted had the strong support of the
President of the Republic, the macroeconomic and expenditure bodies of government (nota-
bly, the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank), and a contingent interested in liberaliz-
ing and developing Kazakhstan’s ﬁnancial system. Arrayed in opposition were many of the
social ministries, many parliamentarians, and much of the popular press. The reformers
ultimately prevailed, in part because of the persuasiveness of their arguments, in part because
the reform’s opponents advanced no viable alternative strategy for curtailing state spending,
and in part because of strong support from the international donor community. Thus, in
accordance with the new law, a major pension reform was introduced e#ective January 1,
1998. The reform pursued the following stated objectives:
 To decrease burdens on the state budget;
 To prevent demographic problems that would ultimately pressure even an initially
viable PAYGO system;
 To establish a close relationship between pension contributions and beneﬁt payments;
 To improve the e$ciency and fairness of the pension system;










Support ratio: Work age
population/ retirement
age population
1999 14.96 1.66 5.4
2000 14.92 1.57 5.9 5.9
2001 14.90 1.58 1.0 5.9
2002 14.91 1.58 0.4 6.0
2003 14.94 1.57 0.6 6.1
2004 14.99 1.56 0.4 6.2
2005 15.07 1.57 0.7 6.3
2006 15.15 1.59 1.1 6.3
2007 15.25 1.60 0.5 6.4
2008 15.37 1.61 0.8 6.4
2009 15.50 1.63 1.3 6.4
2010 15.64 1.67 2.4 6.3
2015 16.49 1.95 3.4 5.5
2020 17.40 2.34 4.0 4.6
2025 18.17 2.80 3.0 4.0
2030 18.84 3.12 2.0 3.7
2035 19.50 3.51 2.4 3.4
2040 20.16 3.90 2.1 3.1
2045 20.82 4.36 2.4 2.8
2050 21.42 4.88 2.2 2.5
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +00 To promote accumulation of savings, formation of capital and advance of economic
growth.
To achieve these objects new pension system established a “three pillar” structure along
the lines and terminology initially suggested by Estelle James and her colleagues at the World
Bank (World Bank, 1994). The ﬁrst pillar is a mandatory Solidarity pension system (PAYGO)
that provides old age beneﬁts in accordance with length of service in the Solidarity system
prior to January 1, 1998, as well as all disability and survivorship beneﬁts. The core second
pillar is a mandatory accumulation pension system based on mandatory pension contributions
by the employers to the individual accounts of workers. These contributions are invested and
accumulated by private accumulation pension funds. Finally, a nascent third pillar involves a
supplemental accumulation pension system based on the voluntary pension contributions of
citizens.
5
Notwithstanding the fact that the second pillar is designed to become the dominant
component of the new pension system, the parameters of the traditional solidarity system are
of interest both for the Government and citizens during the coming decades, as the Solidarity
system will remain valid with regard to the following categories of citizens: 1) those retired
before January 1, 1998; 2) those retired after January 1, 1998 having complete length of
service as a sum of years of work before and after January 1, 1998; 3) those retired after
January 1, 1998 having incomplete length of service as a sum of years of work before and after
January 1, 1998; 4) those retired after January 1, 1998 having no length of service; 5) those
retired before and after January 1, 1998 because of disability; 6) those who lost a breadwinner
of able-bodied age either before or after January 1, 1998. Moreover, the Solidarity system will
provide additional payments from Government to the citizens participating in the accumula-
tive system. If a potential recipient’s total pension under the reformed system appears to be less
than the minimum guaranteed pension, or less than the minimum social allowance in the event
of incomplete length of service, then additional Government payments will make up the
shortfall. In short, the Solidarity system remains an important support pillar for nearly the
entire labor force, and it is clear that Solidarity payments will be the main source of pension
income for most pensioners for many years to come.
By design of the pension reform, the public Solidarity system of pension security must
operate concurrently with the accumulation system during a transition period. Speciﬁcally, this
means that present pension beneﬁt payment include payments from the state Solidarity system
according to years of service accrued up to 6 months prior the beginning of the reform
(January 1, 1998), along with both mandatory and voluntary personal accumulations.
In order to perform functions of the Solidarity pension system, a new State Center for
Beneﬁt Payments (SCBP) was created in place of the State Pension Fund, a Soviet-era legacy
that has been abolished. During the ﬁrst year of the SCBP’s establishment, it collected all
mandatory Solidarity payroll contributions (at a 15% rate on net wages) at the national level,
and made all beneﬁt payments to retirees. But, as of January 1999, SCBP retained responsibil-
ity only for payment of beneﬁts and allowances, along with the maintenance of the national
5 For a summary of these reforms and their rationale, see Palacios and Posarac (2000) for a World Bank
viewpoint; for a fairly dispassionate political history of pension reforms in transition economies, see McKinnon,
Charlton, and Konopielko (1999). Ghai (2002) also provides a broad overview from the standpoint of low and
lower-middle income countries.
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(“SICs”) to all Kazakhstani citizens. This streamlining of the Solidarity system has been of
considerable practical importance, as it transferred responsibility held by regional administra-
tions and a semi-autonomous fund, and placed it in the hands of the national government. This
transfer has meant a marked reduction in pension payments’ arrears, along with the end (to
our knowledge) of payments in kind (various food products) that characterized the early
post-Soviet period in some regions.
To put the new accumulative system into e#ect, three types of new entities were created-
pension funds, asset management companies and custodians. Moreover, after a period of
debate and uncertainty, the National Bank of Republic of Kazakhstan (NBRK) assumed
responsibility as the sole supervisor and regulator of accumulation pension system activities.
Prior to 2001, these functions were carried out in part by the National Pension Agency
(NPA), and in part by the National Securities Commission (NSC).
During the past six years during which Kazakhstan’s pension reforms have been imple-
mented, a large number of legal and institutional changes have occurred —i ne #ect, the
system has evolved in response to problems that have arisen, and as recovery has strengthened
the RK Government’s capacity and given rise to parallel developments in other areas of the
economy. Nor were these changes limited to new accumulative system entities, as both the
system of funding Solidarity pensions and the procedures for deducting pension contributions
to the accumulative system changed as well. Clearly, the initial reform plans and parameters
are not inherently the ﬁnal ones, and it is plausible that they will be altered further depending
upon the economic situation in the country.
1. Institutional reforms and ﬁscal achievements
During the ﬁrst year of the reform, the Law on the Republican Budget of the Republic of
Kazakhstan ﬁxed the rate of mandatory pension contributions to the Solidarity system —t hat
is, to the SCBP —a t 15% of net wage payments. However, from 1999 all mandatory wage
deductions, including wage bill deductions paid to the Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund
(3%), Fund of State Social Security Fund (1.5%), and State Employment Fund (2%), were
replaced by a single social tax. This payroll social tax rate in turn underwent certain changes,
and was raised from 21% at the beginning of 1999 to 26% by the end of the year. As of July
2001 the social tax rate was again reduced to 21%.
6 Upon introduction of a social tax, beneﬁt
payments as well as social allowances started to be funded from the Republican budget.
Though the rate of payroll contributions to the accumulative system has remained at its
initial 10% level since the reform was enacted, responsibility for the contribution burden has
changed fundamentally. Prior to March 15, 1999 pension contributions to the Accumulation
Pension Funds (APFs) were calculated based on the wage bill of enterprises. Since then, they
have been deducted directly from employees’ wages. In e#ect, this change has shifted the
immediate burden from employers to employees. While in economic theory there should be no
long-term di#erence, in practice it appears that wages were not immediately adjusted upward
in compensation in many and probably most cases.
6 This 21% rate applies to regular non-agricultural employees. Foreign administrative and technical sta# are
taxed at 11%; agricultural enterprises make quarterly general tax payments based on output.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +02Table 8 shows how the various changes in the contribution rates to the Solidarity pension
system have a#ected overall pension security since enactment of the reforms. As can be
expected during a period of transition from a PAYGO to an accumulative system, the
immediate impact is to transfer much of the burden for ﬁnancing pension expenditures to the
national government budget. This burden emerges most immediately because of the reduction
T67A: 8. CDBE6G6I>K: P6G6B:I:GH D; P:CH>DC S:8JG>IN, 1997-2002

























Total pension spending 140.4 100.0% 119.7 100.0% 158.9 100.0% 169.9 100.0% 186.7 100.0% 201.5 100.0%
Total RK government
budget
26.5 18.9% 25.4 21.2% 158.9 100.0% 169.9 100.0% 186.7 100.0% 201.5 100.0%
Republican (national
government) budget
N/A n/a 20.1 16.8% 140.8 88.6% 149.8 88.2% 156.1 83.6% 164.3 81.6%
Social security including 139.7 87.9% 145.2 85.5% 141.6 75.9% 162.8 80.8%
Solidarity pensions 99.8 62.8% 101.1 59.5% 105.7 56.6% 120.4 59.8%
Government social
allowances
20.1 16.8% 28.4 17.9% 27.7 16.3% 28.9 15.5% 34.2 17.0%
Special government
allowances
10.7 6.7% 16.1 9.5% 5.5 2.9% 5.8 2.9%
Burial allowances 0.9 0.6% 0.2 0.1% 1.3 0.7% 1.8 0.9%
Social support 0.1 0.1% 2.2 1.3% 0.7 0.4% 0.9 0.4%
Other social support 0.9 0.6% 2.4 1.4% 13.8 7.4% 0.6 0.3%
Local government budgets 5.3 4.5% 18.2 11.4% 20.0 11.8% 30.6 16.4% 37.2 18.4%
State pension fund 78.9 56%
State pension fund arrears











social security & support,
including emergency
spending through transfers to
State Pension Fund(1997)
and SCBP(1998), as % of
GDP
3.7% 4.8% 7.9% 6.5% 5.7% 5.4%
in real terms 100.0 79.6 97.6 92.2 93.5 95.2
Number of pensioners &
beneﬁciaries, 1997100
100.0 96.7 93.2 90.9 88.0 n/a
Lump sum
payments from pension
funds to old age
retirees
0.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.7
Withdrawal of money from
pension accounts due to
emigration
0.05 0.5 5.5 2.5 3.5
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +03in individual payroll contributions for the Solidarity system from 31% to 21%, as this tax was
reduced in order to maintain the overall payroll rate, given that 10% was diverted to
individual accumulation accounts. In addition, the Republican Government assumed respon-
sibility once again for pension payments —r ecall from Section I that the State Pension Fund
was separated from the Republican Government budget from 1990 through 1997 —a nd made
a commitment to reducing arrears and non-cash payments.
The number of new pensioners during the past ﬁve years has been abnormally low, in part
due to massive early retirement in 1992-1997, and in part because of the small size of the
Second World War cohort. While these forces should work to reduce Solidarity expenditure
growth, and indeed both the numbers and real Solidarity pension expenditures have fallen, the
GDP share of RK Government expenditure on pension and social protection remains
relatively high even in comparison with the Soviet era. In 1989, Kazakhstan’s pension
expenditures made up 5.6% of GDP. By 1997, the total share exceeded 10% of GDP
(transfers from the Republican Government budget to cover State Pension Fund arrears alone
came to 3.5% of GDP), and the Republican Government budget cost peaked at 7.9% of GDP
in 1999. Even with high GDP growth and curtailed social security expenditures in recent
years, though, the RK Government is still spending about 5.5% of GDP on Solidarity pensions
and other social support payments.
It is not straightforward to calculate total monthly income actually received by pensioners
and social allowances recipients for each separate category. However, mean monthly pension
and social allowances are reported by category, and it is possible to convert these into constant
tenge terms and calculate growth rates (Figure 12). The obvious point from Figure 12 is that
real pensions and social allowances in 2002 were roughly the same as in 1997, despite very
large increases in real wages and per capita GDP during this period. Depending on one’s
perspective, it is evident that the Kazakhstan Government maintained budgetary discipline,
F><. 12. R:6A AK:G6<: P:CH>DC 6C9 SD8>6A AAADL6C8:H, 1997100
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +1*but that it did so in part by curbing payments to a needy part of the population.
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It is an overstatement to claim that payments by the State to all types of pensioners and
social allowances recipients, and particularly to disabled persons, are su$cient to ensure a
normal living standard. On the other hand, the share of old age pensioners receiving the
minimum pension (in 2001, an amount equal to only 87% of the “living minimum” according
to an assessment by the National Statistical Agency) declined from 58% in 2000 to 15% in
ﬁrst half of 2002. Details on the pensioner and social allowance recipient population appear in
Table 9. The old age category of pensioners, with 70% of all recipients, is the biggest category
among all pensioners and beneﬁciaries.
Of course, in an ideal world all pensioners would receive adequate payments. In practice,
such social largesse is unreasonable to expect in a middle-income country such as Kazakhstan,
and virtually no non-transition nations at its level of development have pension expenditures
as great. Reality (as reported in Palacios and Pallares-Miralles, 2000) is that no East and
Southeast Asian developing and middle income countries spend more than 3% of GDP on
public pension provision, and most spend far less. Public pension spending ranges from 3.7%
7 Although the types of social payments reported in Figure 12 make up only about 75% of total government
expenditure on social and pension provision, they are used by the National Statistics Agency as the sole indicator
of social support to pensioners and beneﬁciaries. This, in turn, distorts to some extent the real situation with
respect to pension provision in Kazakhstan. As Table 8 indicates, along with Solidarity pension and government
social allowances, there are some other types of social support and security ﬁnanced jointly by Republican and
local budgets.
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2,582.0 100.0% 2,349.0 100.0% 2,324.6 100.0%
Pensioners, of whom 1,985.8 76.9% 1,705.9 72.6% 1,675.7 72.1%
Old age pensioners 1,932.0 74.8% 1,658.3 70.6% 1,628.6 70.1%
Including:
On favorable terms 431.3 16.7% 420.3 17.9% 412.5 17.7%
With incomplete service 50.8 2.0% 31.8 1.4% 30.3 1.3%
Other old age pensioners
(on standard terms)
1,449.9 56.2% 1,206.3 51.4% 1,185.8 51.0%
Pensions for su$cient years of
service
40.3 1.6% 37.7 1.6% 37.5 1.6%
Pensioners for special merit,
except WWII disabled
13.5 0.5% 10.0 0.4% 9.7 0.4%
Social allowance recipients 596.2 23.1% 643.0 27.4% 648.9 27.9%
Disabled (all categories) 344.2 13.3% 386.4 16.5% 387.4 16.7%
Survivorship social allowance
recipients
232.2 9.0% 238.5 10.2% 244.0 10.5%
Old age social allowance
recipients
19.8 0.8% 18.2 0.8% 17.5 0.8%
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +1+of GDP in Turkey, to 4.2% in Jordan, to 1.4% in South Korea, 0.4% in Mexico. The only
non-socialist middle-income countries that exceed Kazakhstan’s pension expenditure shares
are Uruguay (15.0%), Argentina (6.2%), and Chile (5.8%) —a nd all three countries are
struggling to contain these expenditures. In a competitive world, high payroll taxes and
government spending pressures have serious e#ects on employment and economic growth, and
it is di$cult to argue for more liberal social expenditure policies. This is especially true for
pension and social allowances in a nation such as Kazakhstan, which faces severe educational
system deterioration, and a need to recover public health services.
The forces underlying both Solidarity and accumulation system contributions can be seen
from Table 10. Payments into both pillars are sensitive not only to GDP and employment;
rather, it is important to analyze labor force structure in order to determine the potential
number of contributors of social tax and pension contributions to Accumulation Pension
Funds (APF).
In the absence of detailed information on taxpayers and delineation into deﬁned catego-
ries of both individuals (by income) and ﬁrms (by type), one of the best ways of acquiring
information on the structure of contributors and their compliance with contribution require-
ments is to examine statistics related both to employment in small enterprises (Table 11) and
in medium and large enterprises (Table 12). O$cial statistics reveal a considerable number of
indicators that describe both employment and wages in Kazakhstan. However, when we limit
consideration to regular tax contributors, then attention must naturally be restricted to
regular, full-time workers. Thus, in assessing the number of those making regular number of
social tax contributors, it is logical to use the number of workers in medium and large
T67A: 10. SD8>6A T6M CDAA:8I>DC IC9>86IDGH, 1997-2001
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total wage bill of actual
contributors, billion tenge, of
which:
339.3 331.6 344.6 435.4 546.4
Wage bill of large & medium
enterprises
325.2 312.0 319.2 395.4 498.9
Wage bill of SMEs 14.1 19.6 25.3 40.0 47.5
Actual collection of social tax (in 1998 -Mandatory pension contribution to SCBP):
Nominal terms, billion tenge 78.9 35.9 70.5 99.1 124.3 133.9
Real terms, 1997 Prices 78.9 33.5 60.8 75.5 87.3 88.8
Real collections, 1997100 100.0 42.5 77.1 95.7 110.7 112.6
Social tax rate, annual average
(in 1998: mandatory pension
contribution rate to SCBP)
25.5% 15.0% 21.8% 25.8% 23.1% 21%
Potential tax collection, billion
tenge
86.52 49.74 67.60 101.10 113.68
Compliance rate 91.2% 72.2% 104.3% 98.0% 109.3%
Actual contributors-full-time workers of large, medium and small enterprises:
Thousand 3,377 2,918 2,514 2,645 2,793
Index, 1997100 100 86 74 78 83
As % of economically active
population
45.4% 41.4% 35.6% 37.2% 37.3%
As % of employed population 52.2% 47.6% 41.2% 42.7% 41.7%
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +1,enterprises who are recorded as having a formal, strong attachment to their jobs (thereby
excluding, for example, women on maternity leave, or on leave to take care of children; or
furloughed workers who left their posts at the initiative of management). For small enter-
prises, it is most appropriate to use the number of those workers on regular assignment
(excluding substitutes and other temporary workers) at each ﬁrm, and whose names have been
submitted to the tax and statistical organs.
As the data for Tables 10-12 demonstrate, in 2001 there were some 2.8 million regular
T67A: 11. SB6AA ECI:GEG>H:H’P 6GI>8>E6I>DC >C
SD8>6A T6M CDCIG>7JI>DCH, 1997-2001
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number of enterprises:
Registered 107,134 93,400 120,500
Operating - - - - - -
Active 71,853 84,396 93,926






As % of registered enterprises 33.0% 48.3% 44.8%
As % of active enterprises 49.3% 53.5% 57.5%
Number of full-time workers,
thousand
204 233 271.1 352.8 390.4
Number, 1997100 100 114 133 173 191
Wage bill, 1997 prices,
1997100
100 128 146 213 239
Real wage growth,
1997100%
100 115 113 144
T67A: 12. L6G<: 6C9 M:9>JB ECI:GEG>H:H’P 6GI>8>E6I>DC >C
SD8>6A T6M CDCIG>7JI>DCH, 1997-2001
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number of enterprises:
Registered 13,378 13,776 12,983 12,978
Operating 11,370 12,304 11,496 11,533
Active 10,777 9,236 10,617 10,910
Of which submitted reports to
National Statistical Agency:
11,717 7,637 6,063 4,730 4,695
Units submitting reports,
1997100
100.0% 65.2% 51.7% 40.4% 40.1%
As % of registered enterprises 57.1% 44.0% 36.4% 36.2%
As % of active enterprises 70.9% 65.6% 44.5% 43.0%
Number of full-time workers,
thousand
3,173 2,685 2,242 2,292 2,403
Number, 1997100 100% 85% 71% 72% 76%
Wage bill, 1997 prices,
1997100
100% 89% 80% 92% 109%
Real wage growth,
1997100%
100% 106% 120% 128% 142%
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +1-contributors of social taxes. Of these. 2.4 million (86%) were employed by medium and large
enterprises, and only 0.4 million (14%) were employed in small businesses. On the basis of
annual wage data recorded for those workers analyzed, we are able to estimate the levels of
social tax contributions. These sum to some 113.7 billion tenge, which is 10.6 billion tenge less
than the o$cially recorded social tax collections in 2001. Considering that 12.5% of receipts
in the social tax budget are set aside to be used in an account to cover Solidarity debts from
previous years, then it is not di$cult to realize that the share of individuals engaging in
entrepreneurial activity, purely on the basis of social tax payments, must have exceeded
payments from the previous year (2000) only modestly. In 2000, participation of individual
entrepreneurs in the entire social tax fund came to only about 2% of the total. Just how tiny
this ﬁgure is can be judged by comparing it with the total self-employed population, the share
of which in total employment rose from 33% in 1997 to 42% in 2001.
This negligible increase in social tax payments by the self employed, despite a growing
labor market share, implies rising aggregate evasion: we estimate that the proportion of the
labor force not making social contributions has risen from 48% in 1997 to 55% in 2001. In
such a setting, only the sharp real wage growth of formal sector employees (by some 42-44%
in 2001 compared to 1997) helped the Kazakhstan Government to stabilize its social tax
revenue situation. These increases were not su$cient to enable social tax collections cover all
social expenditures during 1999-2001, though the need for Republican Government budget
subventions did decline during this period to a (relatively) manageable level of about 2% of
GDP.
The reduced pressure on pensions and social allowances clearly played an important role
in the Kazakhstan Government’s ﬁscal stability, with overall budget deﬁcits in 2000-2001
down to only 0.1% to 0.2% of GDP. But these improvements took place during a time of high
oil prices and rising oil and gas exports. While there can be no doubt that Kazakhstan’s public
accounts are more positive than they were only a few years ago, it remains to be demonstrated
that the pension reforms were essential to this improvement —t hough there can be no doubt
that the international ﬁnancial environment perceived the reforms’ contribution to have been
important (for example, Fitch, 2002: 2), and perceptions themselves are important. Thus, the
obvious questions to arise are whether the pension reforms enabled Kazakhstan to take
otherwise unfeasible strategic steps. For that matter, what advantages did the Kazakhstani
state get from the new pension system? Was the Government’s decision prescient, was it ﬂawed
in any clear manner, and what if any alternatives existed?
2. Achievements of the Accumulation Pension System: illusory or real?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the progress made by the new
accumulative pension system. The obvious point of departure is to consider collection of
pension contributions to accumulation pension funds, and in particular to compare it with
social tax collections, since in principle the two types of contributions should be in ﬁxed
proportions (correcting for changes in social tax collection rates). Figure 13 uses 1998 as a
base year, in part because it was the ﬁrst year of the pension reform, and also because the
collection rate of pension contributions by the SCBP in 1998 (76.1%) and by pension funds
(71.1%) did not di#er dramatically. Di#erences begin to emerge in 1999, when social tax
collections started to exceed pension contributions to accumulation pension funds (APFs). By
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the APFs. Some of this di#erence can be attributed to changes in legislation, according to
which (since March 15, 1999) employers are to pay APF contributions from wage deductions
rather than from their own funds. On the other hand, presumably some of the di#erences also
reﬂect initial lack of conﬁdence in the accumulative pension system, and hence rampant
evasion. That uncertainty as to the e#ectiveness of the accumulative system should have been
great in 1998-99 is hardly surprising in light of the Russian debt crisis, collapse of the ruble,
and the shock e#ects that were quickly transmitted to the Kazakhstan economy, and in
particular to the consumer goods’ industrial sector. The appreciation of the tenge vis-a ◊ -vis the
ruble slowed economic recovery and added to hardships for many ﬁrms, thereby inducing at
least some of them to delay social tax and, especially, accumulation pension payments.
Indeed, conﬁdence in the e$cacy of any reform inevitably will reﬂect the underlying
economic situation. Marked improvements in macroeconomic indicators (including rapid real
GDP growth and controlled inﬂation) by 2002 had an positive a#ect on the discipline with
regard to payment of pension contributions to the APFs. Thus, pension contributions
collection rose by 42% in 2002 compared with previous year, while the social tax collection
grew less than 2%. This, in turn, provides evidence that contribution compliance for
contributors of social tax and pension contribution obligations are again similar, and that with
continued recovery, accumulative pension contributions are likely to catch up with social tax
payments.
In addition to rapid growth of accumulative pension funds as a whole, there has been an
even more dramatic rise in contributions to private pension funds. This accelerating rise of
share of non-state accumulation pension funds (NSAPFs) in total volume of pension contri-
butions for the past four years (Figure 14) strongly indicates increased interest among
population in independent selection of pension funds to which they can trust accumulation of
their future pensions. At least in major urban centers, it is clear that workers near the top of
the income distribution have begun to regard their pension accumulations as real assets to be
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of assets by individuals from one fund to another.
By the ﬁfth year of the reform, Kazakhstan’s increasingly mature and improved regula-
tory, legal, and oversight system has resulted in the stable functioning of 16 pension funds. By
the end of the 2002 the total amount of net pension assets of the pension funds was equal to
258.6 billion tenge (approximately USD 1.6 billion). As of January 2003, 36.6% of assets of
the pension funds were invested into short-term, medium-term and long-term securities of the
Ministry of Finance, 12.7 %w ere in the National Bank’s notes, and 27.5% were held in shares
and bonds of the issuers included in A listing (Table 13). Reduction of the share of investment
in state securities from 99.4% in 1998 to 49.0% in 2002, and a corresponding rise of the
investment share into corporate bonds can be regarded as a major step toward pension funds’
participation in investment in Kazakhstan’s real sector.
The Russian crisis resulted in an early crisis for Kazakhstan’s nascent pension fund
accumulations that prompted RK Government intervention on April 5, 1999. Kazakhstan had
introduced a ﬂoating exchange rate for the tenge in early 1999, largely in response to the
collapse of the Russian ruble, and this caused a sharp decline in the value of Kazakhstan
Government T-bills. In response, the Government of Kazakhstan o#ered Accumulation
Pension Funds the option of converting part of their tenge T-Bills into 5-year US dollar T-Bills
at the pre-devaluation exchange rate.
This move demonstrated Kazakhstan Government’s commitment to ensure a compara-
tively high level of protection to pension accumulations from the inﬂuences of unforeseen
inﬂation and devaluation. As of January 2000, the fraction of ABMEKAM T-bills alone in
pension funds total investment equalled 40.6%. Further restructuring occurred in April 2000
while allocating 7-year GoK Eurobonds. Currency bonds worth USD 244 million (the total
emission of 5-year special currency bonds issued by the Kazakhstan Government Ministry of
Finance in April, 1999) were exchanged for USD 221 million in new Eurobonds (62% of the
total emission). Taking into consideration higher yield on these Eurobonds (11.1% per year),
this exchange was highly favorable for the APFs, and should ultimately increase total pension
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pension system toward greater balance between the State Accumulation Fund and the various
private APFs, indicate growing maturity of Kazakhstan’s accumulation system.
From a macro-ﬁnancial standpoint, Kazakhstan’s pension reforms were a key element of
the establishment of its international credibility. In 2001, Kazakhstan became the ﬁrst Central
Asian nation to receive investment grade status ratings on its sovereign debt. While high oil
prices played an important role in Fitch’s (2002) rating decision, rating agencies do not
anticipate permanently high oil prices, and e#orts to achieve long-term macroeconomic
structural balances were perhaps equally important. Thus, Fitch forecast RK Government
deﬁcits to be in the 2.1% to 3.3% of GDP range for 2001-03, and these forecasts have proven
far more pessimistic than actual deﬁcits. But the key point is that the rating agency greatly
discounted their importance, since their analysis made clear that the APFs could easily absorb
that much debt, and more.
8
Markets are less certain about the desirability of the growing concentration of Ka-
zakhstan’s ﬁnancial sector, including both in banking (where the top four banks control 60%
of all assets: Fitch, 2002: 10) and similarly concentrated pension funds. Because of the system’s
openness to new domestic entrants and the regulators’ policy of actively encouraging potential
8 Speciﬁcally, Fitch (2002: 1) states: A further support to the ratings is provided by the pension reforms started in
1998. Pension reform has reaped beneﬁts by limiting the ﬁscal implications of the previous system, stimulating growth
in domestic capital markets and (for the time being) providing a near-captive market for government paper. Pension
funds hold nearly half of the outstanding stock of sovereign eurobonds, and demand for new government paper
remains strong, providing the authorities with a relatively easy means of debt reﬁnancing, at lower costs than might
otherwise be the case.
T67A: 13. PDGI;DA>D SIGJ8IJG: D; A88JBJA6I>DC P:CH>DC FJC9H, 1998-2000
Type of investment 1998 1999 2002
bn. tenge structure, % bn. tenge structure, % bn tenge structure, %




17.4 78.0% 6.9 13.5% 33,076 12.8%
Including: - 0.0%
NBK Securities 0.5 2.1% 1.6 3.0% 32,827 12.7%
MINFIN securities 17.0 75.9% 5.4 10.4% 249 0.1%
Medium and long term
(maturity-1 year and more)
4.8 21.4% 41.7 81.1% 93,617 36.2%
Including: - 0.0%
AVMEKAM-60 - - 20.9 40.6% - 0.0%
Eurobonds 3.5 15.7% 20.9 40.6% 58,823 22.7%
Securities of international
ﬁnancial organizations
- - 0.4 0.7% 15,203 5.9%
A”-rated issuers’ shares and
bonds
0.1 0.4% 1.1 2.1% 71,106 27.5%
Local government securities - - 0.2 0.4% 1,135 0.4%
Deposits of second level banks 0.0 0.2% 0.9 1.8% 22,825 8.8%
Securities of foreign issuers - - 0.2 0.5% 21,663 8.4%
TOTAL 22.3 100.0% 51.4 100.0% 258,626 100.0%
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +11foreign entrants throughout the ﬁnancial sector, the consolidation that has taken place to date
seems generally positive. Its main e#ect appears to have been the elimination of very small
entities that had no potential to become viable. At the same time, the pension fund industry is
characterized by several aggressive small funds that seek to either gain market niches, or to
ﬁnd new approaches that will enable them to compete aggressively with the large, established
funds.
Taking all factors together, domestic and international ﬁnancial analysts clearly are
optimistic about developments in Kazakhstan’s ﬁnancial sector during the past ﬁve years, and
also clearly attribute much of the success fo the emergence of APFs and the underlying
pension reforms. Yet it is important not to forget that a great deal remains to be achieved.
Monetization of the Kazakhstan economy remains limited: as of the end of 2001, total banking
system assets (around USD 5 billion) were only about one-quarter of GDP; M3/GDP was
only 17% (Fitch, 2002: 10).
9 Even as of early 2003, total APF assets are well below 10% of
GDP. APF asset growth is currently around 2% of GDP, a signiﬁcant but not yet huge share.
Whether this annual absorption capacity of Kazakhstan’s pension funds increases further will
depend on overall economic growth, compliance with legal contribution requirements (and, in
aggregate, the “re-formalization” of the economy), returns on existing assets, and withdrawals
from the system, currently mainly due to emigration to Russia (at which point contributors are
allowed to cash in their assets) but in the future due to growing retirments of contributors.
A looming long-term problem for Kazakhstan’s pension funds is the lack of asset diversity
(Fitch, 2002: 11), which in turn reﬂects low levels of investment demand outside the nation’s
petrochemical industry (which taps international resources of a completely di#erent scale).
Low aggregate investment demand means few bond issues by ﬁrms or local governments; given
restrictions on international asset holdings of pension funds, this inherently means great asset
concentration (especially when one considers that bank deposits by the funds ultimately are
largely investments in government debt). As of the end of September 2001, pension fund
holdings included 62% sovereign eurobonds and RK Government paper, as against 20%
invested in corporate bonds and 7% in A shares (Fitch, 2002: 11). While development of a
mortgage market, new municipal bond issues, and economic growth all will contribute to asset
diversiﬁcation, there is a very long way to go. At present, the pension funds still provide
semi-captive savings to the Kazkahstan Government.
Indeed, a ﬁnal irony of the current situation is that, quite contrary to its initial
expectations, the Kazakhstan Government does not need these savings (Figure 15) nearly to
the extent initially envisioned. High oil prices and rapid economic growth have enabled the
Kazakhstan Government to weather the initial pension reform period with declining and
currently modest deﬁcits, despite the fact that reduced social contributions create a short-term
deﬁcit balloon. Limited demand for savings from the Republican and local governments, and
from private investors, when coupled with growing supply of pension fund assets, inevitably
causes a crash in yields, and this is exactly what has happened. Yields on RK Government
T-bills have plummeted (to below 8% as early as the end of 2001, and even lower since), and
maturities of issuance have lengthened markedly as well. While these developments greatly
9 As the Fitch (2002) report notes, Kazakhstan’s banking system also remains heavily dollarized, with about
60% of all domestic deposits denominated in US dollars. Pension funds assets are also heavily invested in euro or
dollar-denominated assets.
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greatly reduce short-term proﬁtability of the nation’s accumulation pension funds.
This situation was not one foreseen until quite recently. Initial concerns were that the
move from the Solidarity system would simply cause the “marketizing” of the nation’s social
expenditures, and that in a high-demand, low-savings environment, the RK Government
would pay unsustainable yields to fund asset holders. With economic growth and high oil
prices, the reverse is far closer to coming true, and there are now grave concerns that pension
funds will not be able to o#er substantially positive returns (a point emphasized by Ra-
mazanov, 2003, who also discusses liquidity problems arising from the limited bonds market).
This problem ultimately is not one that can be solved by the pension system, however —t he
true underlying limitation is a low level of investment demand outside the petrochemical
industry, and addressing this “real sector” problem is one of the nation’s greatest tasks.
III. Initial Assessment and Remaining Issues
As heated debates in Kazakhstan’s press have made clear, the nation’s pension reform has
had both strong proponents and opponents. The former group considers the reforms as one of
the Kazakhstan Government’s major achievements, while many of the latter regard it as
socially calamitous. Between these groups like neutral observers whose initial skepticism is
slowly being replaced with cautious optimism —a nd who recognize that success will depend
largely on successes in other economic spheres. In light of the accumulative system’s clear
ability to generate a sizeable, liquid savings pool, unbiased observers also recognize that the
reforms have contributed signiﬁcantly to the emergence of a nascent, modern ﬁnancial sector.
It is premature to support or oppose unambiguously Kazakhstan’s pension reforms
involving a move from a conventional state-run PAYGO system to a largely private system of
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read an outline of the achievements (such as in Marchenko, 2002) and not be impressed —b ut
ﬁve years is a very short time from the perspective of pension reforms.
What can be claimed without question is that the reforms were important to the
Kazakhstani state, and that they greatly reduced ﬁscal pressures —a n especially important
matter when the reforms were initially conceived, during a period of low oil and minerals’
prices. But there were other ways to reduce social spending obligations and achieve mac-
roeconomic stability, and the question remains whether these ﬁscal beneﬁts merited such a
controversial reform, while other former Soviet nations with similar problems undertook more
gradual steps, either moving more cautiously toward a funded pension system or keeping the
solidarity system while reducing its expenditures.
Beyond improving ﬁscal balances, however, Kazakhstan’s pension reform was viewed as
an integral component of its capital market development strategy.
10 Opponents’ criticism that
radical pension reform was premature in the absence of developed capital market misses this
point, as the strategy of the National Bank and economics ministries was to undertake a bold
but risky simultaneous advance on two fronts.
Indeed, Kazakhstan’s reform was more than bold: it appears to have been virtually
unprecedented.
11 While Kazakhstan’s reformers consciously copied the Chilean model, at the
inception of pension reform in Chile in 1980 there were 32 di#erent social security institutions,
regulated by numerous laws (Infante, 1998: 24). Relative to Kazakhstan, Chile’s pre-reform
social expenditures were quite small, as the nation’ social welfare system was far from
comprehensive (Rajnes, 1998). Thus, it was possible for Chile to cover system transition costs
fairly easily, especially as it enjoyed large privatization proceeds during the early transition
period. Also unlike Kazakhstan, Chile has a market-oriented economy that has developed
institutions since the 19th century, and as such had a far more developed ﬁnancial system than
did Kazakhstan in 1997. Indeed, before 1998, ﬁnancial institutions in Kazakhstan were limited
to commercial banks and insurance companies. Despite the circumstances under which
pension funds were introduced, however, it is apparent that they have become important very
quickly. A lower-bound indication of the role of pension-related entities is given by Table 14,
which shows ﬁnancial sector assets in both 1997 and 2002 —t hough only net assets for the
pension funds.
The emergence of pension funds, asset management companies and custodians were
consistent with Kazakhstan’s move toward a market economy. Creation of such market
participants in fact does not appear to have been premature, especially as the Kazakhstan
Government concurrently introduced a well-conceived regulatory structure “to provide for a
clear separation of accounts and responsibilities so that a system of checks and balances could
thwart any fraud and abuse” (Andrews, 2001:18). On the contrary, such diversiﬁcation of the
ﬁnancial system’s institutional structure has had a striking number of longer term e#ects —
from added competition and new ﬁnancial products, to dramatically improved ﬁnancial
10 While never o$cially stated, the reform appears as well to have been intended as a signal both to the world
and to its own population that Kazakhstan intended to be one of the most rapidly transforming formerly socialist
states, and that its Government was determined to break irrevocably with the nation’s socialist past.
11 Among other reformers, only Hungary could conceivably claim to have taken a comparably bold step prior to
Kazakhstan (for a multi-country review, see McKinnon, Charlton, and Konopielko, 1999). In contrast, Russia’s
reform is following Kazakhstan’s by four years (Afanasiev, 2003).
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only for the pension system, but also for professional development of insurance and other
markets.
To fully grasp the signiﬁcance of the concurrent development of a private pension
industry and a modern ﬁnancial system, it is important to recognize that all of the institutions
of the accumulative pension system were established on what was practically a tabula rasa.
Even without raising the issues of the importance of credits from the World Bank, and
technical assistance from USAID and other international organizations in enabling Ka-
zakhstan’s pension reform to take place, it is necessary to emphasize that these credits and
assistance were spent on developing the most basic ﬁnancial and ﬁscal system infrastructure:
1. Installation of a State Center for Beneﬁt Payments’ central and oblast/raion computer
system to provide a central data base to record the receipt of contributions to individual
accounts;
2. Development of modern tax collection techniques;
3. Establishment of a training program for individuals to build capacity for both pension
funds and asset management companies;
4. Establishment of training programs for individuals to build capacity for the National
Bank of Kazakhstan, the National Securities Commission, the National Pension
Agency, the State Center for Beneﬁt Payments, and the State Accumulation Fund;
5. Development of regulations for the State Accumulation Fund, the non-state (private)
accumulation funds, and the asset management companies, concerning licensing,
commissions, reporting and disclosure, accounting and auditing, asset transfers, pru-
dential regulation, portfolio limits, and minimum capital requirements satisfactory to
the National Bank; and
6. Development of Kazakhstan’s actuarial capacity.
Even a seemingly straightforward step such as developing actuarial capacity in reality
involved starting from nearly a clean slate —a nd also has had many implications for















All financial institutions 203 2.3 100.0% 240 9.0 100.0%
Including:
Commercial banks 82 2.2 97.6% 38 6.7 73.9%
Credit unions 2 0.0 0.0% 38 0.0 0.2%
Pawnshops 35 0.0 0.2% 53 0.0 0.1%
Insurance companies 70 0.1 2.2% 34 0.1 1.5%
Pension funds (net assets only) 0 0.0 0.0% 16 1.7 19.3%
Other institutions, fulﬁlling
some banking operations
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that it entails moving to a private accumulative system, cannot proceed without the develop-
ment of an actuarial profession. The forecasts of future pension incomes of contributors and
payment obligations cannot be undertaken without actuarial modeling and analysis. This holds
true for private pension funds; it also holds at the macroeconomic level, to the extent that the
Government of Kazakhstan continues to meet pension and disability obligations to those who
contributed mainly to the Solidarity system, or who for other reasons have not built
accumulation accounts.
At the outset of the reforms, the Government depended on the assistance of foreign
consultants and local specialists who had independently acquired macro-actuarial modeling
skills, or who had taken corresponding short-term training under a World Bank technical
assistance program. While not ideal, this su$ced as long as analysis was restricted to
assessments of the soundness and obligations of the nation’s Solidarity system, and to simple
projections of likely outcomes from a switch to a mixed system with a substantial accumulative
component. But limited domestic actuarial capacity was not viable once the reforms were
underway, and private pension funds were up and running. Moreover, with the adoption by
the Government of Kazakhstan of the new Law on Insurance Activities that came into e#ect
on January 1, 2001, the training of professional actuaries became a matter of utmost urgency
—a s these actuaries through the newly-established Actuarial Society of Kazakhstan were
charged with the legal right and obligation to give mandatory actuarial assessments of
insurance reserves.
Consider from another standpoint the willingness of the Government of Kazakhstan to
take an unprecedented risk by creating a private pension system designed to help its “parent”
ﬁnancial system mature, rather than to emerge as an o#spring. Pushing ahead with ﬁnancial
market development undoubtedly was a high priority for the Government —a nd was a
priority that had strong international approval, as reﬂected by the o$cial market status
accorded Kazakhstan by the EC in 2000 and by the United States in 2002. Could the ﬁnancial
system have developed as rapidly without pension reform? We believe not. At any rate, there
was a clear impact on rapid ﬁnancial development by the emergence in place of the giant State
Pension Fund of new institutions, including pension funds, asset management companies, and
custodians.
To critics of pension reform, the new system seems both hopelessly complex and lacking
a social safety net. Complexity is inherent in a system of checks and balances, in which each
of these new institutions and each new technical development plays a particular role in a
structure designed to minimize risks of falsiﬁed pension claims and erroneous (in either
direction) beneﬁt payments. Again, while it is early to draw conclusions, the initial impression
is that regulation has been e#ective, and fund management has been professional, both in the
private and state sector. This absence of fraud and theft will in turn translate into increased
conﬁdence in both pension funds and in the ﬁnancial sector more broadly —a nd restoring
conﬁdence is a key element of economic recovery. Indeed, absent reform, who could have
guaranteed that the old State Pension Fund could have avoided the destiny of the Mandatory
Medical Insurance Fund, whose former general director stole 150 million tenge from the Fund
in 1998 and has since disappeared?
Beyond macro considerations and ﬁnancial development, the Government of Kazakhstan
had a third critical motive. Recall that early retirements exploded in Kazakhstan in the early
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uncertain. Only by moving to a system of individual accounts could the Kazakhstani
Government ensure a dramatic reversal of the incentive to retire early —a nd with the
post-war baby-boom generation approaching middle and late-middle age, long-run economic
and labor market stability demanded a response.
It is true that there are options that would change the rules of the Solidarity system in
order to restore macroeconomic balance. However, e#ective Solidarity reforms would also
have proven to be unpopular, especially as the likely point of departure would have been a
planned further increase in retirement age, and likely restrictions on premature pensions.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that these moves would have been more palatable politically than
moving toward an accumulative system. Furthermore, success in curtailing Government
obligations would not be guaranteed —t here would always be strong pressure to increase
payments, roll back retirement age increases, and o#er liberal premature retirement options,
even if social tax collections fell way behind system costs. The new accumulation system has
been criticized heavily because of accounting errors (especially early in the reform, when
SCBP often had multiple records for individuals), but it is also clear that there has been much
data manipulation in the Solidarity system.
Therefore, from the standpoint of the Kazakhstani Government, reforming the Solidarity
system had costs and disadvantages at least as great as those associated with the accumulative
system. Nor did it have any of the advantages that made the accumulative reform so attractive
to the economics ministries —i ts contribution to the development of the ﬁnancial sector, and
more ironclad control over social spending, and hence improved macro balances. This reduced
social obligation was expected to encourage foreign capital investment (which, outside the
minerals’ sectors, remains disappointingly small) and enhance Kazakhstan’s international
credit rating (which in fact has been achieved). The recent emergence of nascent domestic
bonds and mortgage markets, both aimed at tapping retirement savings pools, suggests that the
simultaneous pension and ﬁnancial reform may indeed have positive spillovers in both
directions. In short, the accumulative system reform was a bold but natural step for a
government determined to achieve economic recovery.
1. Remaining issues
While it is not surprising that market-oriented reformers supported Kazakhstan’s pension
reform, and while many of the reform’s opponents raised criticisms without recognizing the
costs of viable alternatives, it is also true that many problems associated with the reform have
not been addressed e#ectively. Because the reform was adopted as part of a ﬁnancial
development push, it is also not surprising that the main issues deal with social questions.
The most discomforting aspect of the reform is its gender inequity. Women earn lower
wages than men in Kazakhstan as elsewhere, and spend only half as many years working, per
year of expected retirement, as do men. This latter disparity reﬂects longer retirement life
spans for women, labor force withdrawal to raise children, and the ﬁve-year gap in retirement
age. Consequently, any pension reform that reduces the insurance component provided by a
pooled, deﬁned beneﬁt system is also going to be beneﬁcial to men and disadvantageous to
women. The accumulative system sharply reduces the redistributive role of social security,
thereby beneﬁting high-income men at the expense of low-income women. The extent to which
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Urzhumova (2000); whether poor women will are made absolutely worse o# will depend on
the rate of return to pension assets, and the base level of government support. This issue would
be of limited importance in a society with virtually universal marriage; however, sharply
falling marriage rates in Kazakhstan (and a sharp spike in age-speciﬁc marriage rates) imply
that many women will never marry.
To date, the Kazakhstani Government has not addressed the gender inequity issue,
although there is no doubt that it does not want to deliberately disadvantage women. An easy
option would be for the state to make pension contributions for a woman during maternity
leave. Yet another possibility is to require retirees with savings above a certain level to
purchase annuities, with the mortality rates that determine annuity payouts pooled over both
men and women (thus preventing shorter-lived men from receiving higher annual payouts
than women receive from an identical savings pool). These issues have little practical impact
on pension payments today, and therefore are not urgent, but need to be addressed in the near
future.
A second issue that relates to the impact of the reform on poor, single women concerns
the level of the Government of Kazakhstan’s minimum pension. This minimum is provided to
all disabled and elderly retirees who have not accumulated adequate amounts. In practice, it
amounts to a continuation of the Solidarity system, but at a ﬁxed minimum, for a substantial
portion of the population. Given that very few of the 40 percent of Kazakhstanis who live
in rural areas can expect to accumulate adequate private savings, and that many urban
dwellers also will fail to do so, it is likely that the majority of Kazakhstan’s elderly will receive
minimum pensions for decades to come. This should not be taken as a criticism of the
accumulative system, though —r ather, it reﬂects the fact that Kazakhstan is a middle-income
country. However, it does imply that all concerned should recognize that the “accumulative
system” is really an “accumulative plus Solidarity” system, and will continue to be for the
foreseeable future.
The level of these minimum pensions in turn depends on the Government of Kazakhstan’s
overall targeted level of spending on pensions and social allowances. The Government faces
domestic political pressures for this spending to grow in real terms as the economy recovers,
and increases are in fact likely. The rate of increase is a very emotionally charged one: on the
one hand, the state spends considerable resources on infrastructure and prestige projects that
might be diverted to social expenditures. At the same time, though, deteriorated schooling,
public health, and maternal and child care in particular are also high priorities, and it is
di$cult to criticize the Government for giving preference to at least some of these concerns
over pensions and social allowances. However, it is fair to say that the share of public spending
that should be committed to pensions and social allowances has not yet been resolved, and
needs to be addressed. It is also clear that there is enormous popular pressure (and hence
pressure from populist politicians) to increase pensions. By the standards of transition
economies, Kazakhstan’s Solidarity pensions provide a replacement rate that appears to be
well below average (Palacios and Posarac, 2000: 13), and also below historic Soviet aver-
ages.
12
A fourth set of issues concern the uses of the savings generated by private pension
12 However, Kazakhstan’s public pension replacement rates are comparable to Russian rates. As economic
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minerals’ sector, along with the fact that oil and other minerals require investments on a
di#erent scale than those that could be funded by pension savings to date, and that the
minerals’ sector has access to international sources of capital. At present, high oil prices have
reduced Government’s need for deﬁcit ﬁnancing as well, and interest rates have fallen sharply.
While there are some new initiatives involving municipal bonds and mortgages, at present
Kazakhstan’s pension funds face a dearth of investment opportunities.
Thus far, the Kazakhstani Government shows no inclination to abandon ﬁscal rectitude
and borrow these available assets cheaply (and then spend the proceeds). At the same time, it
has not taken the audacious and somewhat risky move of strongly encouraging local infra-
structural development by underwriting local government debt. To do so requires further
political decentralization, and for many reasons the Government is moving cautiously along
this path. Nor has a system of underwriting (and hence encouraging) corporate debt issuance
emerged. Moves along these lines have risks and costs as well as beneﬁts, but there is little
doubt that the ultimate success of an accumulative pension system requires healthier levels of
investment demand.
Finally, some have criticized the Kazakhstani Government for introducing a deﬁned
contribution plan instead of retaining a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan, to be funded at the
enterprise or national level, but not on a PAYGO basis. DB at the enterprise or pension fund
level in principle transfers risks from the individual contributor to the ﬁrm or pension fund. As
is apparent from Tables 2, 11, and 12, many enterprises until recently could not have absorbed
this risk. With the development of human capital (experienced actuaries and ﬁnancial analysis)
and technical conditions (computerization and institutional structure), it is possible that
pension funds and insurance companies could begin moving toward providing DB products in
the coming years. An obvious example is the provision of plans with guaranteed payments or
rates of return —a lthough the insurance component of such an option is not a free good. At
present, regulatory restrictions remain that make the emergence of such products problematic,
and one hopes that further maturation of the new system will be accompanied by the removal
of these constraints. On the other side, it is also impossible at present for a pension fund to o#er
a menu of portfolios, or for an individual contributor to hold multiple assets at a single fund,
as is common in, say, the United States. Ultimately, liberalization in this area is desirable as
well.
2. Completing the circle
Kazakhstan’s reforms have created an environment in which the ﬂow of pension contri-
butions has become transparent for contributors. Most pension reform opponents forget that
the State Pension Fund was separated from the Republican Government Budget in 1990. To
this switch corresponded a legal obligation by the USSR Pension Fund (which transferred as
an obligation of the Kazakh SSR Pension Fund and, in 1993, the Republic of Kazakhstan
Pension Fund) as follows: guarantee of a full accounting and registration to payers of
mandatory insurance and social contributions, undertaken concurrently by supervisory organs
recovery restores Kazakhstan’s per capita income to Soviet-era levels, though, there is great pressure to raise
pensions and to prevent replacement rates from falling further.
2004] @6O6@=HI6C’H E:CH>DC HNHI:B +2/of the nation’s tax service, and intended to ensure in full the collection of means to provide
pension security. Organization of accounts of contributions and expenditures was directed to
be undertaken to comply with this guarantee. In practice, this assignment could not be
e#ectively realized because of the absence of personiﬁed accounts of social insurance contribu-
tions, because of the low level of computerization of the organs of social security, and because
of various deﬁciencies in the legal base from which they would be operating. The fact that this
intended reform from the late Soviet era was not carried out prior to the 1998 reforms does not
mean that the law and associated directives were invalid, however. Rather, these earlier actions
signaled an intention to create transparent, individual accounts nearly a decade before action
was taken. While the late Soviet reforms occurred in the absence of a private ﬁnancial market
(and thus were intended to be the forerunner of a “notional” deﬁned contribution system), it
is clear that the reforms actually undertaken in large part reﬂect the spirit of these earlier
reforms —a nd then went beyond them in the new environment.
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